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CABLE TELEVISION RIGHTS OF
WAY: TECHNOLOGY EXPANDS THE
CONCEPT OF PUBLIC FORUM

From 1974 to 1984 the number of cable television subscribers
in the United States rose from 8.7 million to 30 million and the
number of cable systems grew from 3158 to 6200. 1 This growth
has forced courts to evaluate the guidance that the first amendment should provide for cable television policy. The courts haye
entertained questions ranging from the public's right of access to
the cable system to the proper standards for regulating broadcasts over the cable system. 2 Recently, in City of Los Angeles v.
Preferred Communications, Inc., 3 the United States Supreme
Court considered a cable television company's claim that it had
a right of access to public rights of way in setting up a cable
television system. The City of Los Angeles maintained a
franchising scheme whereby only one company was granted access to public rights of way in any one market." The Court recognized that the cable company's claim implicated the first
amendment, 11 but declined to resolve the question of the applicable first amendment standard to be used in evaluating claims of
access to public rights of way. 6
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1985 542, 545 (105th ed. 1984) [hereinafter BUREAU OF THE CENSUS]. By
1990, projections show that there will be 55 million cable television subscribers. Id. Cable
television permits broadcast of numerous television stations' signals to a receiver at any
one time. The cable company builds a "head end" facility (a satellite dish or antenna)
that picks up broadcast signals from various television stations. Speaker & Wirtschafter,
Cable Television Franchising, in 1983 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 131, 149 n.1 (M. Meyer & J. Viera eds.). These signals are then sent to customers
through cables utilizing public rights of way involving utility poles or underground
conduits.
2. E.g., Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978) (challenging
mandatory access requirements); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (reviewing FCC orders regulating broadcasts over cable systems).
3. 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
4. Local governments may regulate television franchising. 47 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. III
1985). Normally, one cable company receives an exclusive franchise for a particular area.
Other cable companies are effectively denied use of the public rights of way.
5. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 494.
6. Id. at 495.
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This Note argues that the public forum analysis is the proper
standard for evaluating a cable television company's claim of access to public rights of way. Part I discusses the constitutional
basis for this standard. Part II examines the ideological justifications for the public forum doctrine and argues that public rights
of way are public forums for cable television purposes. In addition, it explains the application of the public forum doctrine to
cable access questions and the doctrine's advantages over other
standards.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS

To demonstrate that the public forum analysis is the appropriate first amendment standard by which to evaluate access
claims to cable rights of way, it is necessary to explain why cable
television is a first amendment speaker. Further, a brief history
of the development of public forum analysis will show that cable
access claims are an appropriate subject for public forum
analysis.
A.

Cable Television as a First Amendment Speaker

Until recently, no court had decided whether a cable company's claim of access to public rights of way fell within the protection of the first amendment. To receive this protection, a
speaker must disseminate ideas and information. 7 The Supreme
Court stated in City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc. that a cable television company's claim of access to
cable rights of way implicates the first amendment. 8 Cable television activities fall within the definition of speech. 9 Specifically,
cable television companies are engaged in the dissemination of
speech. 10 They do so not only by transmitting others' broadcasts
but also by originating their own programming. 11 Cable televi7. Id. at 494.
8. Id. ("We do think that the activities in which respondent allegedly seeks to engage
plainly implicate First Amendment interests.").
9. Id. ("Cable television partakes of some of the aspects of speech and the communication of ideas as do the traditional enterprises of newspaper and book publishers, public
speakers and pamphleteers.").
10. Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir.
1982).
11. Id.
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sion companies disseminate entertainment, news, and ideas. 12
These are the types of activities traditionally protected by the
first amendment. 13
Cable television activities are speech and government regulation of them raises first amendment concerns. The proper standard by which to evaluate cable companies' claims of access for
speech purposes remains to be settled.

B.

The History of the Public Forum Doctrine

Courts use public forum analysis to evaluate claims of access
to public property by first amendment speakers. The public forum doctrine originated in cases evaluating first amendment
speakers' assertion of access rights to streets and parks. As
speakers' access claims have grown to include other types of government property, the Supreme Court has consistently applied
the public forum analysis to such access rights. Presently, cable
television companies are making similar access claims to public
rights of way, seeking the protections afforded other first
amendment speakers who have made public property access
demands.
1. Streets and parks- Those seeking access to streets and
parks presented the first claims of access to public property for
the purposes of speech. Initially, the Supreme Court was hostile
to their claims.
In Davis v. Massachusetts, the Court denied a speaker access
to a public park for the purpose of delivering a speech. 14 Although the speaker claimed first amendment protection, the
Court decided the case on property law principles. 111 The Court
determined that the local government had the power to restrict
access to public property in the same way a private owner may
restrict access to his property. 16 First amendment protection
ended where property law began.
12. Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652, 657 (N.D. Ohio
1968).
13. Id.; see also City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488, 49495 (1986).
14. 167 U.S. 43 (1897) (upholding a conviction under an ordinance that required a
permit from the mayor before one could give a public address on Boston's public
grounds).
15. Id. at 47.
16. Id.
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The Court next considered the issue of distributing literature
on public streets in Lovell v. City of Grif/in. 11 The Court, without raising the property law issue, held that requiring a person
to get permission from a city official before distributing literature violated the freedom of the press clause 18 of the first
amendment. 19 For the first time, the Court recognized the importance of access to public property in order to give substance
to first amendment protections.
A year later, Justice Roberts articulated the public forum doctrine in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization. 20 In
contrast to Davis, he stated that the first amendment's free
speech clause protected access to public property for the purposes of speech:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of streets
and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
citizens. 21
This right of access was not absolute but "must be exercised
in subordination to the general comfort and convenience. " 22 In
subsequent cases, the Court continued to recognize streets and
parks as public forums. 23
2. Other real property access claims- The civil rights
movement of the 1960's provided courts the opportunity to extend rights of access to government controlled property beyond
streets and parks. In Brown v. Louisiana, civil rights protestors
17. 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (overturning a conviction for violating a city ordinance banning the distribution of literature within the city without the written permission of the
city manager).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
... of the press . . . . ").
19. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451.
20. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (involving the arrest of union members for violating an ordinance that required persons to obtain permits from the mayor before distributing literature or holding public meetings).
21. Id. at 515.
22. Id. at 516.
23. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). In these cases,
known as the Jehovah's Witnesses Cases, the Court recognized parading and distributing literature as appropriate first amendment activities for streets and parks.
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claimed access to a public library to protest silently against discriminatory library policies. 2 • Although the property involved
was not traditionally "held in trust for communication," 211 the
Court recognized the importance of the first amendment right at
issue. Although reasonable regulations were appropriate, the
Court acknowledged the protestors' right to protest silently in
the library. 28
Despite significant extension of the public forum doctrine, the
Court returned to the property analysis of Davis u. Massachusetts21 in Adderley u. Florida. 28 In Adderley, a group of protestors sought access to jail grounds. 29 The Court held that the government, just as a private owner, could restrict access to its
property. 30
After Adderley, it was unclear what property would or would
not be a public forum. Adderley, however, was the last case in
which the Court used property law principles alone to decide access claims to government-controlled property.
3. Quasi-property access claims- More recently the Court
has evaluated claims of access to other types of public property
or "quasi-property." It has continued to use the public forum
analysis.
A claim of access to a school district's mailing system was at
issue in Perry Education Association u. Perry Local Educator's
Association. 31 The Court developed a three-tiered analysis,
based on the character of the property involved, for evaluating
claims of access to public property. 32 The first category of property, exemplified by streets and parks, has traditionally been
open as a forum for speech. 33 The second category includes
24. :38:J U.S. 1:31 (1966).
25. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
26. Brown, 383 U.S. at 142-43.
27. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
28. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
29. Id. at 40.
30.
The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. For this
reason there is no merit to the petitioners' argument that they had a constitutional right to stay on the property, over the jail custodian's objections, because
this "area chosen for the peaceful civil rights demonstration was not only 'reasonable' but also particularly appropriate."
Id. at 47-48.
31. 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (evaluating a claim by a rival union that it should have access
to the school district mailing system, when access had already been granted to the union
then representing the teachers of the school district).
32. Id. at 45-46.
33. Id. at 45.
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property dedicated to expressive activity-for instance, a municipal theatre. 34 The government may regulate these two types of
property through the use of content-neutral, narrowly drawn,
time, place, and manner restrictions. 3 ~ The third category consists of nonpublic forums that have neither been open to the
public nor dedicated to expressive activity. 36 This category could
be exemplified by Postal Service letterboxes. The government
may regulate nonpublic forums in any manner it sees fit, as long
as the regulation is reasonable and is not merely designed to
suppress speech based on disagreement with its content. 37 The
Court found the teachers' mailboxes in Perry to be nonpublic
forums and held that the restrictions on the access to the school
mailing system were permissible. 38
Cornelius u. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund
presented a recent opportunity for the Court to discuss the public forum analysis. 39 The plaintiffs, various political advocacy
groups, sought access to a federal charity drive conducted in the
federal workplace. 40 Under the Perry three-tiered analysis, 41 the
Court held that the charity drive was a nonpublic forum. 42 Although the plaintiffs claimed access to a fund drive rather than
to real property, the Court found it appropriate to evaluate the
claim by using the public forum analysis.
The history of the public forum doctrine demonstrates that a
claim of access to government controlled property for purposes
of speech requires use of the public forum analysis. Although the
types of property to which speakers have sought access have
changed, the Court has consistently applied the public forum
doctrine. Cable television companies are similarly first amendment speakers seeking access to government controlled property,
i.e., public rights of way. They occupy the same position as those
speakers to whom the public forum analysis has historically
been applied.
The Supreme Court, while not deciding the issue, implied that
the public forum standard should apply to cable companies'
34. Id.
35. Id. ("The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of
expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.").
36. Id. at 46.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 50-51.
39. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
40. Id. at 790-93.
41. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
42. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804-05.
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claims of access to public rights of way." 3 Although declining to
decide the issue of the appropriate standard, the Court referred
to Cornelius, then the Court's most recent discussion of public
forum analysis, suggesting that it was thinking in terms of public forum analysis. 44
II.

PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS AND CABLE TELEVISION COMPANIES

The history of the public forum doctrine supports the claim
that the public forum analysis is applicable to access claims to
public rights of way by cable companies. Nevertheless, such
rights of way, especially under the present approach, may not
qualify as public forums. The ideological policy justifications for
the public forum doctrine suggest that public rights of way
should be public forums." 11

A. Ideological Policy Justifications for the Public Forum
Doctrine as They Relate to Cable Television
The need for a marketplace of ideas to test their truth provides one justification for the public forum doctrine." 6 Cable
television provides such a marketplace by transmitting a variety
of ideas through a single source. This diversity was a goal of
Congress when it passed the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984."7 Restriction of access to only one company, however,
43. 476 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986) (citing public forum cases, including Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc .. 473 U.S. 788 (1985), and Members of the
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)).
44. Id. at 495. "Of course, the conclusion that respondent's factual allegations implicate protected speech does not end the inquiry. 'Even protected speech is not equally
permissible in all places and at all times.'" Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799
(1985)).
45. One justification for allowing access to public forums is that they serve as the
poor man's printing press. The Supreme Court has suggested that a forum is necessary
for the "poorly financed causes of little people.'' Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 146 (1943). This justification, however, is not applicable to cable television
companies.
46. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
47. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 21, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, 46
U.S.C. app. §§ 484-487, 50 U.S.C. § 1805 and in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); H.R.
REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. & AoMIN. NEWS
4655, 4656 ("The legislation also contains provisions to assure that cable systems provide
the widest possible diversity of information services and sources to the public, consistent
with the First Amendment's goal of a robust marketplace of ideas-an environment of
'many tongues speaking many voices.' ").
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reduces the possibility of such a market developing. One company is likely to present only one set of "ideas." Competition
among several cable television companies in the same television
market assures an abundance and variety of differing views and
opinions.
Public forums also provide protection against government
censorship and control of speech. 48 Allowing local governments
to restrict access to one company raises the possibility of the
government's selecting a particular company because of the content of its programming. This restriction may result in limiting
access to differing viewpoints and distorting public discussion. 49
For example, in a community with a high concentration of a particular religious group, the local governing body may award the
cable franchise to a company which that group controls resulting
in censorship by that religious group. A society that places such
great emphasis on the freedom of expression and that receives so
much of its information through cable television 110 cannot tolerate such a possibility.
The policy justifications for the public forum doctrine demonstrate that the public forum analysis is the best standard to use
in evaluating cable access claims. To ensure a market place of
ideas and prevent government censorship, cable rights of way
should be held to be a public forum.

B. Public Forum Analysis as Applied to Cable Television
The public forum analysis is also the most appropriate legal
standard for courts to use in evaluating cable companies' access
claims to public rights of way. Application of the public forum
analysis suggests that public rights of way are a public forum.
The justifications given for regulating public rights of way are
weak and fail to take into account important first amendment
48. Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public Forum Doctrine and the Return of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 335, 339 (1986) ("Foremost among these values is protection
against government impedance of viewpoints the government itself does not favor, particularly in the form of content- and viewpoint-based restrictions on expression.").
49. Note, The First Amendment and Cablevision: Preferred Communications, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 22 TULSA L.J. 229, 256 (1986); see also Preferred Communications,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1409 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd on other grounds,
476 U.S. 488 (1986).
50. From 1950 to 1983 the number of homes receiving daily newspapers rose from
53.8 million to 62.6 million. During the same time period, the number of homes receiving
cable television service rose from .01 million (1952) to 25 million (1983). BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, supra note 1, at 542.
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concerns. Additionally, the public forum standard offers advantages over other standards that have been used to evaluate
claims of access to public rights of way.
1. Public Forum Doctrine- Requiring municipal franchise
licenses of those seeking access to public rights of way is facially
content-neutral legislation. 111 Therefore, reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions are permissible.112 In addition, "[t]he nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable.' " 113 These restrictions "must be narrowly tailored to further the State's legitimate interest." 114 The extent to which the
government's interest will control, given the current categorical
approach, depends on the category of property into which public
rights of way fall.
Property is divided into three categories for the purposes of
public forum analysis. 1111 These include: (1) traditional public forums exemplified by streets and parks, (2) property dedicated to
expressive activities-a limited public forum, and (3) nonpublic
forums.
For situations that do not fit the traditional public forum
analysis, a showing that the forum has been dedicated to a communicative purpose satisfies the requirement for a limited public
forum. Because cable television companies are first amendment
speakers 116 seeking access to property dedicated to use by cable
companies, the public rights of way are limited public forums.
Courts that have faced this issue have found that a public forum
claim was adequately alleged by a showing that the local government had dedicated public rights of way for use by cable
companies. 117
Because the degree of permissible regulation may change as
technology advances, and increased expressive activity takes
place through cable television, these rights of way may fall
51. See 47 U.S.C. § 544(0 (Supp. III 1985) (prohibiting content regulation). But see
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1375 (10th Cir. 1981)
(discussing plaintiff's claim that the limitation is content-based because it results in the
"better" speaker being chosen).
52. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
53. Id. at 116 (quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV.
1027, 1042 (1969)).
54. Id. at 116-17.
55. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
57. See Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330,
1338 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d
1396, 1408-09 (9th Cir. 1985), a{f'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
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within the first category of public forum property. 58 If technological advances make available a large number of cable transmissions in a small space, many companies will be able to use
the public rights of way at one time. Much of the important
communication of the day may move from the streets to the
cable systems. Over time, the public rights of way may become
the "traditional" public forums.
Under the Supreme Court's categorical approach to the public
forum question, whether a forum is public or nonpublic depends
on the intent of the government as to the property's use and the
nature of the property at issue. 59 Some commentators have argued that cable access rights of way are nonpublic forums because local governments' limitation of access to only one company evidences an intent that public rights of way are not to be
public forums. 60 A more thorough examination of the intent of
the government is required, however. States set aside public
rights of way intending to aid development of cable communication.61 By allowing cable companies to use public rights of way,
the government evidences an intent to use the property for communicative purposes. 62 In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, by contrast, the plaintiff sought access to a
charity campaign for the purpose of soliciting funds. The Court
denied the demand due to the government's legitimate interest
in avoiding disruption of the workplace. 63 Furthermore, in Cornelius, the restriction to access, placed on a particular class of
speakers, was deemed reasonable in light of the purpose served.
In the cable area, the only relevant class distinction is between
those who have access and those who do not. Access restrictions
58. Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 1562 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
("[I]n determining the degree of constitutionally permissible regulation, we must keep in
mind that [cable television] technology may change over time; such developments may
change the degree of permissible regulation.").
59. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
60. One author found the public forum standard to be the constitutional standard
applicable to cable companies' claims of access but stated that public rights of way are
nonpublic forums. Note, Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles: Impact
of the First Amendment on Access Rights of Cable Television Companies, 35 CATH. U.L.
REV. 851, 874-81 (1986). Despite the claim that cable rights of way are nonpublic forums,
the author argues that limitation of access to one company is unreasonable in light of the
forum's purpose. Id.
61. Note, Aid or Obstruction? Government Regulation of Cable Television Meets the
First Amendment-Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 665, 684 (1986).
62. Id. at 684-85.
63. 473 U.S. 788, 805 (1985).
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cannot be reasonably based on allowing access only to those with
access already and disallowing access to those without.
Use of public rights of way by more than one cable company
will not prevent other uses of the property. 64 Interference resulting from unrestricted access would justify some degree of time,
place, and manner regulation. 611 It would not, however, justify
defining cable as a nonpublic forum. Holding that public rights
of way are nonpublic forums does not take into account the vast
technological advances underway in the field of cable television
that may reduce interference with other uses of the public rights
of way.
2. The categorical and functional approaches to public forum analysis- A finding of a limited public forum under the
present three-tiered approach would allow certain time, place,
and manner restrictions on cable television's access to public
rights of way. 66 This is known as the categorical approach. In the
past, however, the Supreme Court has often used a more functional approach. 67 The functional inquiry is directed toward the
compatibility of the manner of expression with the type of property involved. 68 The nature of the property, the activities that
normally take place there, the method of the communication,
and the appropriateness of the method of communication for the
type of property involved are all considered. 69 The historical development of the public forum cases highlights the difference between the categorical and functional approaches.
The present categorical approach, which emphasizes the nature of the property involved, results from the fear that all government property would become a public forum without a bright
line to distinguish public from nonpublic forums. 7 ° Finding a
particular forum to be a public forum results in such a restriction on allowable regulations that the Court may only do so reluctantly. In attempting to avoid this possible domino effect,
however, the Supreme Court reaches results without a fair assessment of the competing interests at stake, including the inter64. Note, supra note 61, at 684; see infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
65. Note, supra note 61, at 693.
66. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
67. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
68. Id. at 116 ("Although a silent vigil may not unduly interfere with a public library,
. . . making a speech in the reading room almost certainly would. That same speech
should be perfectly appropriate in a park.").
69. For an in-depth discussion of the differences between and development of the
categorical and functional approaches, see Werhan, supra note 48.
70. Id. at 418-19; see, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304
(1974); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 165 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
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ests of the speaker, the necessity of access, and the existence of
more narrow solutions. 71 Furthermore, the categorical approach
ignores important first amendment policies and values by looking only to the character of the property without a full consideration of the effect that a finding of a nonpublic forum would
have on speech. 72
The functional approach, however, allows a balancing of the
interests without the domino effect; not all government property
will be considered a public forum. 73 At the same time, this approach more carefully considers the first amendment interests of
the speaker. 7 " The Supreme Court will probably continue to use
the categorical approach in deciding future public forum cases.
Although the functional approach seems better equipped to handle novel situations, the conflict between the two approaches remains unsettled and unrecognized by the Court.
Should the Court return to a functional approach, it may find
other regulation to be appropriate. The functional approach
would allow a court to find that cable rights of way are public
forums, while at the same time recognizing the necessity of some
degree of regulation based on the "uses to which the public
property is normally put. " 711 Also, the functional approach is
more responsive to the technological changes taking place in the
cable television field. As changes take place, the functional approach will include the changes in the assessment of the permissible degree of regulation. Should the Court apply the categorical approach and find that cable rights of way are nonpublic
forums, the Court will have difficulty changing the degree of permissible regulation in light of changed technologies. The functional approach allows a greater degree of freedom as the technology advances and the need for regulation decreases. 76
3. Justifications for regulating access to public rights of
way- Franchising authorities have argued that restricting access to public rights of way to a single cable television company
71. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983);
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
72.

Werhan, supra note 48, at 418.

73. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (holding an antinoise
ordinance near a school building constitutional).
74.

Werhan, supra note 48, at 424.

75.

Adderley, 385 U.S. at 54 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.

76.
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is a necessary regulation. They have offered several justifications
for restricted access. 77
Municipal authorities argue that cable television space is entitled to less constitutional protection because it is a scarce resource. 78 Although the broadcast medium is scarce due to the
limits of the electromagnetic spectrum,79 scarcity, in this sense,
is not applicable to cable. 8 ° Cable is scarce in that a limited
number of cables may be placed in the public rights of way. 81
Franchising authorities maintain that this physical scarcity enables them to restrict access to the public rights of way to a single cable television company. 82
Regulation of a public forum must be narrowly drawn to serve
a significant government interest. 83 Restricting access to a single
cable company is not a narrowly drawn regulation. As the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated:
We cannot accept the City's contention that, because the
available space on such facilities is to an undetermined
extent physically limited, the First Amendment standards applicable to the regulation of broadcasting permit
it to restrict access and allow only a single cable provider
to install and operate a cable television system. 84
In addition, with technological improvements such as cable companies' ability to transmit their signals through smaller and
smaller spaces, such as fiber optics, the physical scarcity justification remains weak.
77. For a thorough discussion of the justifications for regulation of cable television in
general, see Note, Expanding the Scarcity Rationale: The Constitutionality of Public
Access Requirements in Cable Franchise Agreements, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 305 (1986).
78. Several courts have rejected this argument. See, e.g., Preferred Communications,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd on other grounds,
476 U.S. 488 (1986); Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 1563
(N.D. Cal. 1984).
79. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (allowing more restrictive
regulation of broadcast content because the broadcast frequency was a scarce resource).
This claim is presently the source of much criticism. E.g., Telecommunications Research
& Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
80. Century Fed., 579 F. Supp. at 1563. There is an almost infinite number of stations that can be brought into a home by means of cable.
81. See, e.g., Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404; Century Fed., 579 F.
Supp. at 1563.
82. The municipalities involved in both Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1403,
and Century Federal, 579 F. Supp. at 1563, made this argument.
83. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
84. Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir.
1985), aff'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
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Second, franchising authorities argue that the economic scarcity of the resource justifies restricting access to rights of way. 811
Essentially, they claim that the operation of cable television results in a natural monopoly. 86 It is not economically feasible,
they argue, for more than one cable company to do business in
any one market. 87
This justification is well accepted because the theory of natural monopolies explains the development of public utilities and
justifies restricting the operations of these businesses to only one
company. 88 One court has rejected the claim that cable television
is a natural monopoly. 89 The court stated that numerous cable
companies operating in one market would not involve the degree
of public inconvenience that numerous utility companies operating within one market would entail. 90 If this claim is true, then
the government has no significant interest in restricting access
to the public rights of way, thus making the regulation unnecessary.91 Nor does empirical evidence support the conclusion that
cable television is a natural monopoly. 92 The fact that there is,
at present, usually only one cable company in each market does
not provide evidence that cable television is a natural monopoly.
Local governments limit access to only one company and
thereby skew the evidence. 93
Another argument for restricting access is that the cost of installing a cable system outweighs the cost of serving subscribers
85. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.-2d 1370,
1378 (10th Cir. 1981); Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 1563-64
(N.D. Cal. 1984).
86. The municipalities in both Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1375, and
Century Federal, 579 F. Supp. at 1563, made this argument.
87. Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1378 ("[C]able broadcasting is a monopolistic industry because it is not economically viable for more than one cable company to operate in any given geographic area.").
88. Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652, 657 (N.D. Ohio
1968).
89. Id.
90.
Unlike water, gas and electric companies where there is great public inconvenience in having numerous concerns serving the same geographical market,
CATV [cable television] is not a natural monopoly. There is only the inconvenience of having another pair of wires, if that, involved in having an additional
CATV company in a geographical market.
Id.
91. Id.
92. Lee, Cable Franchising and the First Amendment, 36 VAND. L. REV. 867, 880-84
(1983).
93. Id. at 880-81; see also Note, Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles: First Amendment Rights and Cable Television Franchising Procedures, 17 PAC. L.J.
965, 970 (1986).
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and only one company can economically operate in a market.
Again, evidence shows that, although these economic factors are
present, they are not sufficient ground for the elimination of all
competition in the cable industry. 94
Even assuming that cable television does operate as a natural
monopoly, that fact alone is not a sufficient justification for regulation of an activity protected by the first amendment. 911 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has stated
that economic scarcity does not justify regulation of newspapers
and therefore does not justify regulation of cable television. 96
The final justification for restricting access is that cable disrupts the use of public resources and constitutes a nuisance. 97
That cable television does involve some degree of disruption is
undisputed: "[Cable television] operating differs significantly
from newspaper publishing in that the former entails far more
disruptive use of the public domain, viz., attaching cables to
utility poles or digging up streets to bury the cables."98 Such disruption, however, does not justify restricting access to only one
company.
The regulation resulting from inconvenience is distinct from
restricting access altogether. 99 Restricting access to only one
company is not narrowly tailored to the government interest involved. A narrowly tailored solution would not set access according to an arbitrary number. Moreover, technological advances
may reduce the force of this argument by allowing cable companies to operate with little or no disruptio·n to the public.
4. Advantages of the public forum analysis- The public forum analysis offers many advantages over the analysis provided
by balancing, prior restraint, and the comparative media analy94. See Lee, supra note 92, at 882-83.
95. See, e.g., Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1055 (8th Cir. 1978); Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
96. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 46. But see Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378 (10th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit has attacked
the conclusion reached in Community Communications. Preferred Communications,
Inc., v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd on other grounds,
476 U.S. 488 (1986) ("[The analysis) suggests that simply because cable's disruption of
the public domain gives rise to a need for licensing, it would also justify the monopoly
the City seeks to create by its auction process.").
97. See, e.g., Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1405; Century Fed., Inc. v. City
of Palo Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 1564 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
98. Century Fed., 579 F. Supp. at 1564.
99. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1406 ("Regulating such use and inconvenience, however, is quite different from restricting access, as the City attempts to do
here.").
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sis. These other approaches fail to take fully into account the
first amendment concerns at issue.
Several courts have used a balancing approach. 100 This approach involves weighing the interests of the cable companies
against those of the local government. 101 The balancing approach, however, is not sufficient to protect the first amendment
rights of cable companies. The Supreme Court has recognized
that where the first amendment is involved, the claim that a regulation is rational is not sufficient. 102 The public forum analysis
provides the higher level of scrutiny required.
A prior restraint analysis is also inadequate to evaluate access
claims of cable companies. Prior restraint merely prevents local
governments from limiting access to one company where more
cable space is available. Although one court has used this type of
analysis, 103 others have ignored this standard. Prior restraint
analysis fails to take into account the interests of the government in preventing disruption of its resources: the focus is exclusively on the first amendment speaker. Striking down franchising ordinances under prior restraint analysis is only a temporary
solution to the problem. Although application of prior restraint
analysis may prevent enactment of laws that restrict access, this
will occur only so long as there exists space for cable. Once
rights of way are full, courts will need to adopt a new method.
In determining the appropriate first amendment standard, one
must also consider the nature of the medium of speech utilized.
"Each medium of expression . . . must be assessed for First
Amendment purposes by standards suited to it . . . . " 10" Differ100. See Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127-28 (7th
Cir. 1982); Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1375-80; see also Note, supra note
61, at 674 n.63.
101. The balancing approach used by courts has been more narrow than the functional approach discussed herein. The courts have put a heavy emphasis on the scarcity
and economic arguments without a searching analysis of the first amendment interests at
stake. Although considering the interest of the cable companies, the courts have failed to
consider the public's interest in a marketplace of ideas. They have also failed to consider
technological changes taking place. Essentially, the courts have looked to see if the regulation is rational in light of the government's interest in keeping rights of way free from
disruption.
102. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986)
("Where a law is subjected to a colorable First Amendment challenge, the rule of rationality which will sustain legislation against other constitutional challenges typically does
not have the same controlling force.").
103. Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 891, 901
(W.D. Mo. 1985).
104. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th
Cir. 1985) (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975)),
aff'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
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ences in media may demand differences in the applicable first
amendment standard. 1011 These considerations have led some
courts to utilize a comparative media approach, 106 comparing
and contrasting cable with broadcasting and newspapers. 107 The
approach focuses on the degree to which three factors-physical
scarcity, economic scarcity, and disruption of the use of public
resources-affect each of these media. 108
The comparative media approach is inadequate for two reasons. Despite the claim that it addresses the unique aspects of
cable, it fails to do so by not considering cable's dependence
upon access to public rights of way. 109 Although this approach
may lead to the conclusion that different standards should apply
to cable, it does not answer the question of the permissible degree of regulation. 110
.
Public forum analysis ensures that a franchising authority will
be able to restrict access to one cable company only in rare instances. The government will not be able to use the access regulation to disguise content regulation:
[T]he means chosen by the City to serve its interests-allowing only the single company selected through
the franchise auction process to erect and operate a cable
system in each region-creates a serious risk that city officials will discriminate among cable providers on the basis of the content of, or the views expressed in, their proposed programs. 111
The public forum analysis allows for the vast technological
change currently taking place in the cable television field. 112 It is
the type of analysis best suited to deal with technological
changes.
105. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1403. "[D]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them." Id. (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)).
106. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 12728 (7th Cir. 1982). See generally Note, supra note 60.
107. Note, supra note 60, at 857.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 869.
110. Id. at 863-65.
111. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1406 (9th
Cir. 1985), a/f'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
112. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1052 (8th Cir. 1978). "Moreover,
communications technology is dynamic, capable tomorrow of making today obsolete. . . . 'At the very least, courts should not freeze this necessarily dynamic process
into a constitutional holding.'" Id. (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic
Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 132 (1973)).
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CONCLUSION

Local governments have generally restricted access to public
rights of way dedicated to the use of cable operations to one
cable company. Cable companies have recently begun to challenge this practice. Although the access issue implicates the first
amendment, courts have not adopted a single standard for evaluating these claims. This Note has proposed that the appropriate analysis for evaluating cable companies' access claims is the
public forum analysis. Applying this analysis to claims of access
to public rights of way follows the historical development of the
public forum doctrine. Application of this analysis also helps to
ensure that government does not influence the content of cable
speech. Protection against government censorship is one of the
most important justifications for the development of the public.
forum doctrine. Public forum analysis takes into account the legitimate interests of the government in regulating cable access,
while allowing for the rapid technological changes taking place
in the field.

-Lawrence E. Spong

